Resenha de: Aspectos do Novo Radicalismo de Direita (T. W. Adorno)ADORNO, Theodor W. Aspectos do Novo Radicalismo de Direita. Tradução e apresentação de Felipe Catalani. São Paulo: Unesp, 2020. (Coleção Adorno).

Este artigo tem por objetivo investigar a posição que a educação ocupa na teoria da justiça como equidade de John Rawls. Para tanto, analisar-se-ão os principais aspectos referentes ao tema presentes nas seguintes obras do autor: Uma Teoria da Justiça, O Liberalismo Político e Justiça como equidade: uma reformulação. O papel desempenhado pela educação sofre alterações consideráveis ao longo do desenvolvimento dessas obras. Primeiro, percebe-se uma preocupação de Rawls com uma forma de educação mais direcionada à formação moral e a (...) sua relação com o conceito de autonomia e a constituição de um senso de justiça. Em seguida, nota-se que o lugar ocupado pela educação é redirecionado para uma forma política e cívica, focada no exercício da cidadania frente ao pluralismo e à diversidade característicos das sociedades democráticas atuais. Neste texto, o intuito principal é ressaltar que a educação ocupou um papel secundário e marginal em todas as obras analisadas, salientando que, muito embora o papel da educação seja fundamental na promoção de sociedades justas, ele não é reconhecido em plenitude pelo autor em questão. Ao fim, uma alternativa será apresentada: devido à centralidade da educação para a constituição de sociedades democráticas justas, ela deve estar situada no cerne da estrutura básica, como uma instituição social e uma exigência própria da justiça. (shrink)

Why are mistaken beliefs about Covid-19 so prevalent? Political identity, education and other demographic variables explain only a part of individual differences in the susceptibility to Covid-19 misinformation. This paper focuses on another explanation: epistemic vice. Epistemic vices are character traits that interfere with acquiring, maintaining, and transmitting knowledge. If the basic assumption of vice epistemology is right, then people with epistemic vices such as indifference to the truth or rigidity in their belief structures will tend to be more susceptible (...) to believing Covid-19 misinformation. We carried out an observational study (US sample, n = 998) in which we measured the level of epistemic vice of participants using a novel Epistemic Vice Scale. We also asked participants questions eliciting the extent to which they subscribe to myths and misinformation about Covid-19. We find overwhelming evidence to the effect that epistemic vice is associated with susceptibility to Covid-19 misinformation. In fact, the association turns out to be stronger than with political identity, educational attainment, scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test, personality, dogmatism, and need for closure. We conclude that this offers evidence in favor of the empirical presuppositions of vice epistemology. (shrink)

We prove that the category of Nachbin’s compact ordered spaces and order-preserving continuous maps between them is dually equivalent to a variety of algebras, with operations of at most countable arity. Furthermore, we observe that the countable bound on the arity is the best possible: the category of compact ordered spaces is not dually equivalent to any variety of finitary algebras. Indeed, the following stronger results hold: the category of compact ordered spaces is not dually equivalent to any finitely accessible (...) category, any first-order definable class of structures, and any class of finitary algebras closed under products and subalgebras. An explicit equational axiomatisation of the dual of the category of compact ordered spaces is obtained; in fact, we provide a finite one, meaning that our description uses only finitely many function symbols and finitely many equational axioms. In preparation for the latter result, we establish a generalisation of a celebrated theorem by Mundici: our result—whose proof is independent of Mundici’s theorem—asserts that the category of unital commutative distributive lattice-ordered monoids is equivalent to the category of what we call MV-monoidal algebras.Abstract taken directly from the thesis.E-mail: [email protected]: https://air.unimi.it/retrieve/handle/2434/812809/1698986/phd_unimi_R11882.pdf. (shrink)

Nos sumus Romani, qui fuimus ante Rudini, “We who once were Rudians are now Romans”. One of the most known in the Annals of Quintus Ennius, this fragment explicitly refers to the citizenship granted to the poet, probably in the year 184 BC, one of the dates accepted as terminus post quem for the beginning of the composition of his epic poem. Even in other fragments, although less explicitly, Ennius shows this sense of belonging, as he calls himself a Roman, (...) besides being the bard to Rome’s res gestae. By means of a combined study of these fragments, this text aims to analyze the image the poet creates of himself as a Roman citizen within the Annals and, therefore, how his persona is self-represented. (shrink)

Karl R. Popper e Raymond Aron foram dois dos mais destacados pensadores do século XX, notadamente a partir da segunda guerra mundial. Sendo o primeiro um destacado epistemólogo e filósofo político e o segundo um filósofo social e político, entre suas mais diversas obras encontramos um denominador comum, a crítica epistemológica das ciências humanas. O presente trabalho tem por objetivo investigar os possíveis pontos de contato entre os dois filósofos, bem como suas divergências. Como metodologia de estudo, nos centraremos nos (...) textos produzidos pelos autores que tenham como tema principal a epistemologia das ciências humanas. Notadamente, encontraremos em ambos uma crítica ao historicismo como fundamento das humanidades. Palavras-chave: Karl Popper, Raymond Aron, Historicismo. (shrink)

O ficcionalismo, geralmente classificado como um tipo de nominalismo, apresenta como perspectiva precípua a tese de que os entes matemáticos são ficções. Para o ficcionalista, o discurso matemático é desprovido de conteúdo. Hartry Field, que é o principal defensor dessa concepção ontológica da matemática, contesta, em Science Without Numbers, a utilização de entes matemáticos na redação de teorias da física, alegando que a defesa mais plausível do realismo ontológico matemático é o argumento da indispensabilidade de Quine-Putnam. O ficcionalismo defendido por (...) Field nos permite, de acordo com Shapiro, classificá-lo no grupo filosofia-primeiro, ou seja, entre os filósofos que defendem que a filosofia deve ser responsável por legislar a respeito da prática matemática. Dessa forma, podemos considerar Field um revisionista epistemológico. Como se sabe, a dependência da ciência moderna em relação ao discurso matemático coloca a tese ficcionalista em xeque. Ainda assim, se partirmos dos pressupostos filosóficos da vertente formalista da filosofia da matemática, que concebe a matemática como constituída de um conjunto de regras sem significado que podem ser manipuladas de maneira puramente sintática, poderemos traçar importantes analogias entre matemática e ficção, tal como também entre metamatemática e metaficção. Para um formalista simpático à tese ficcionalista, o estatuto ontológico da matemática é semelhante ao das regras de um jogo de xadrez. (shrink)

A view that emancipates free will by means of quantum indeterminism is frequently rejected based on arguments pointing out its incompatibility with what we know about quantum physics. However, if one carefully examines what classical physical causal determinism and quantum indeterminism are according to physics, it becomes clear what they really imply–and, especially, what they do not imply–for agent-causation theories. Here, we will make necessary conceptual clarifications on some aspects of physical determinism and indeterminism, review some of the major objections (...) against libertarian conjectures, and show that there is no conceptual incompatibility preventing us from taking a ‘quantum-libertarian’ approach to the problem of free will. In particular, we will illustrate the possible role of self-causation (causa sui) as a potential solution to otherwise apparently incompatible or even paradoxical statements concerning free will and quantum indeterminism. (shrink)

RESUMO: Esse trabalho tem por objetivo analisar o construtivismo político da Terceira Conferência da obra Liberalismo Político, de John Rawls. Especificamente, vamos tentar compreender como, limitando o universo de construção aos parâmetros estabelecidos pelo discurso político, podemos estender o alcance dos princípios acordados na posição original para uma comunidade muito mais ampla frente às doutrinas morais abrangentes. Demonstraremos o construtivismo político coerentista não em oposição ao intuicionismo moral utilitarista nem ao construtivismo moral kantiano, mas como capaz de absorver modelos com (...) esse grau de razoabilidade. Isso será disposto através de uma justificação pública tanto do conteúdo quanto da forma do modelo adotado. Assim, o consenso sobreposto apresentado por Rawls é responsável direto pelo resultado democrático que esperamos de uma sociedade onde a publicidade ocupa espaço enquanto fato e possui um valor aceito como legítimo. Nosso método de trabalho envolve uma leitura analítica do texto e de comentadores pertinentes ao assunto proposto.ABSTRACT: This study aims to objective analyze the political constructivism of the Third Conference of the work Political Liberalism, by John Rawls. Specifically, we understand how limiting the universe of construction to the parameters by the political discourse, we can extend the reach of the principles agreed in the original position to a much larger universe in the face of comprehensive moral doctrines. We demonstrate what political constructivism no consistent as opposed to utilitarian moral intuitionism or the Kantian moral constructivism, but as capable of absorbing models with this degree of reasonableness. This will be provided through a public justification of both the content and form of the model adopted. Thus, the overlapping consensus presented by Rawls is directly responsible for the democratic results we expect from a society where democracy takes up space as a fact and has a value accepted as legitimate. KEYWORDS: Constructivism; justification; liberalism. (shrink)

Resumo: o presente artigo tem o objetivo central de sugerir uma aproximação entre a teoria da justiça de Rawls e o liberalismo de Mill. Vamos nos apoiar em dois elementos metodológicos para isso: o fato de Rawls ter admitido um tipo de consequencialismo pela via institucional e a sua filiação a um nível mitigado de intuicionismo na base da sua teoria da justiça. A primeira característica busca a correção de políticas institucionais, levando em consideração determinadas finalidades sociais de comunidades políticas (...) liberais: coordenação, eficiência e estabilidade; a segunda, por seu turno, se refere a não podermos provar uma teoria normativa, no sentido tradicional de prova empírica, algo antecipado por Mill. Para Rawls, teorias normativas em geral devem ter a sua disposição elementos de especulação que não podem ser demonstrados aprioristicamente. No construtivismo político, essa postura não está expressa no sentido reducionista, empregado pelo princípio da utilidade de Mill, mas enquanto procedimento. Por fim, vamos apresentar uma vantagem do consequencialismo utilitarista tendo em vista a adjudicação em casos de dolo e culpa, nos quais, segundo tal interpretação, é extrapolado o limite institucional. Mesmo assim, resguarda-se o mérito de Rawls de se aproximar do liberalismo político de Mill, se afastando de uma teoria moral abrangente. (shrink)

Nosso objetivo neste trabalho é, em primeiro lugar, apresentar o modelo de liberalismo proposto por John Stuart Mill como relevante para o construtivismo da teoria política de John Rawls. Para tal, vamos mostrar que o contratualista americano em alguma medida subscreve o liberalismo do utilitarista inglês. Vamos aproximar ambos os autores no tocante ao método intuicionista e verificar se ainda há alguma vantagem no consequencialismo de Mill. Para Rawls, um procedimento intuicionista é ligado a um conjunto de princípios que não (...) pode ser reduzido. Mill se encaixa na definição, portanto, na medida em que advoga um tipo de hedonismo, característica que o americano descarta, por poder ser listada como teoria moral abrangente. Mesmo assim, precisamos verificar até que medida é possível considerar o utilitarismo de Mill como tendo influenciado o liberalismo de Rawls. Assim, levaremos em conta que ele autorizou, pelo menos parcialmente, um método intuicionista e mostraremos que isso se deu por influência da filosofia política de Mill. Fica assim admitido que o apelo à intuição está na base da teoria da justiça, mas tudo somado pode ficar perfeitamente claro onde reside o equilíbrio lógico proposto por Rawls. Mesmo com o desacordo final, é possível notar a influência do projeto liberal do londrino em torno da teoria política que resultou na _Teoria da Justiça_. Restará ainda tentar saber se realmente é possível se afastar de um consequencialismo e se há alguma vantagem teórica em se manter filiado a uma teoria política e ética como a de Mill do ponto de vista jurídico institucional. Isso porque o consequencialismo com um viés estritamente constitucional, como aquele sugerido por Rawls, não parece ser capaz de solucionar um problema jurídico externo ao hermético sistema teórico proposto nas teorias da justiça contemporâneas. (shrink)

According to the extended cognition thesis, an agent’s cognitive system can sometimes include extracerebral components amongst its physical constituents. Here, we show that such a view of cognition has an unjustifiably anthropocentric focus, for it tends to depict cognitive extensions as a human-only affair. In contrast, we will argue that if human cognition extends, then the cognition of many non-human animals extends too, for many non-human animals rely on the same cognition-extending strategies humans rely on. To substantiate this claim, we (...) will proceed as follows. First (Sect. 1), we will introduce the extended cognition thesis, exposing its anthropocentric bias. Then, we will show that humans and many non-human animals rely on the same cognition-extending strategies. To do so, we will discuss a variety of case studies, including “intrabodily” cognitive extensions such as the spinal cord (Sect. 2), the widespread reliance on epistemic actions to solve cognitive tasks (Sect. 3) and cases of animal cognitive offloading (Sect. 4). We’ll then allay some worries our claim might raise (Sect. 5) to then conclude the paper (Sect. 6). (shrink)

The Routledge International Handbook of Neuroaesthetics is an authoritative reference work that provides the reader with a wide-ranging introduction to this exciting new scientific discipline. The book brings together leading international academics to offer a well-balanced overview of this burgeoning field while addressing two questions central to the field; how the brain computes aesthetic appreciation for sensory objects, and how is art created and experienced.

The abrupt beginning of the Philebus refers to the abrupt interruption of the dialogue with Callicles in the Gorgias. The reuse of the phrase αὐτὸς γνώσῃ (Phlb. 12a9 = Gorg. 505c9), unique in Plato, is an evident sign of the will to connect the two texts and contexts. Both of them deal with the problem of the interruption of the philosophical dialogue. The absolute lack of contextualization and the ‘open’ conclusion in the Philebus are consistent with this framework. The continuity (...) with the Gorgias is also a fundamental reason why Socrates returns as protagonist in a late dialogue. It also allows us to put forward a hypothesis on the identity of Philebus, an emblematic character like Callicles. (shrink)

Gorgias, the teacher of Isocrates, is rarely mentioned in Isocrates’ works and never in a flattering way. He is also presented, among other masters and poets, on Isocrates’ grave in a way that appears to be consistent with his pupil’s thought. Thus, the author of the iconographic plan of the grave may have been either Isocrates himself or someone who suffi­ciently knew his works and properly understood his tempestuous rela­tionship with his master.

In this article, I address a controversial aspect of Rawls’s treatment of the question of justice between generations: how the parties in the original position could be motivated to select Rawls’s preferred principle of intergenerational savings, which he dubs the just savings principle. I focus on the explanation found in his later work, where he proposes that the correct savings principle is the principle that any generation would have wanted preceding generations to have followed. By expanding upon this explanation, I (...) respond to the objection that this explanation disregards the perspective of the first generation. I demonstrate that this objection ceases to be a concern when a proper account of the parties’ reasoning is developed. What is notable about the explanation I defend is that it relies on the parties adopting maximax – not maximin – as a rule for rational decision making. Having established this intermediary conclusion, I depart with Rawls and consider what savings principle the parties would choose if given more options. Ultimately, I argue that the parties would select a principle that Rawls would have undoubtedly rejected if presented to him at face value. This is because the principle of savings I argue would be selected requires continual economic growth over generations to increase upwards indefinitely – a conclusion Rawls is explicitly trying to avoid in his theory of justice. (shrink)

We are grateful to the commentators for their close reading of our article 1 and for their challenging and interesting responses to it. We do not have space to respond to all of the objections that they raise, so in this reply, we address only a selection of them. Some commentaries question the usefulness of developing an account of the sort we provide, 2 or of revising the Standard Account (SA) in doing so. 3–5 Our schema is intended to provide (...) a framework for developing a full account of invasiveness that captures existing uses of the term. On the assumption that the term is used somewhat reliably and consistently–and we are inclined to agree with some of our commentators 3 4 that people are not terribly confused or mistaken in how they employ the term–an account that captures these... (shrink)

The aim I am pursuing here is to describe some general aspects of mathematical proofs. In my view, a mathematical proof is a warrant to assert a non-tautological statement which claims that certain objects (possibly a certain object) enjoy a certain property. Because it is proved, such a statement is a mathematical theorem. In my view, in order to understand the nature of a mathematical proof it is necessary to understand the nature of mathematical objects. If we understand them as (...) external entities whose 'existence' is independent of us and if we think that their enjoying certain properties is a fact, then we should argue that a theorem is a statement that claims that this fact occurs. If we also maintain that a mathematical proof is internal to a mathematical theory, then it becomes very difficult indeed to explain how a proof can be a warrant for such a statement. This is the essential content of a dilemma set forth by P. Benacerraf (cf. Benacerraf 1973). Such a dilemma, however, is dissolved if we understand mathematical objects as internal constructions of mathematical theories and think that they enjoy certain properties just because a mathematical theorem claims that they enjoy them. (shrink)

As neuroscience progresses, we will not only gain a better understanding of how our brains work, but also a better understanding of how to modify them, and as a result, our mental states. An important question we are faced with is whether the state could be justified in implementing such methods on criminal offenders, without their consent, for the purposes of rehabilitation and reduction of recidivism; a practice that is already legal in some jurisdictions. By focusing on a prominent type (...) of view of free action, which I call bypassing views, this paper evaluates how such interventions may negatively impact the freedom of their subjects. The paper concludes that there will be a tension between the goals of rehabilitation and reduction of recidivism, on the one hand, and the negative impact such interventions may have on free action, on the other. Other things equal, the better that a particular intervention is at achieving the former, the more likely it is to result in the latter. (shrink)

In his 1920 monograph Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis apriori the young Reichenbach distinguished between two meanings of the a priori: ‚apodictically valid, true for all time‘ and ‚constituting the concept of object‘. At the end of the 1990s Michael Friedman drew again the attention of philosophers of science to this forgotten distinction. In the spirit of Reichenbach’s early Kantianism Friedman attempted to construct a relativized or temporally variable a priori, which is nevertheless constitutive of the object of knowledge. Friedman rejects an (...) alternative historicized version of the a priori elaborated by the Marburg school and in particular by Cassirer. According to Friedman, Cassirer defended a regulative, but absolute version of the a priori, the existence of a yet-to-be-found set of final principles that are conditions of all scientific experience. This paper suggests that using the constitutive/regulative distinction as a basis for comparison is misleading. In order to understand the Marburg school’s conception of the a priori one should get back to Hermann Cohen’s interpretation of Kant and in particular to his own distinction between two meanings of the a priori. A more suitable comparison is that between Cohen’s opposition metaphysical-vs.-transcendental a priori and Reichenbach’s distinction apodictic-vs.-constitutive a priori. If the comparison is conducted along these lines—as already suggested in the mid-1920 s by the Dutch neo-Kantian Alfred C. Elsbach—it turns out that Cohen and the Marburg school and not Reichenbach provided a good example of a relativized a priori. (shrink)

This book fills a major gap in the ever-increasing secondary literature on Hannah Arendt's political thought by providing a dedicated and coherent treatment of the many, various and interesting things which Arendt had to say about law. Often obscured by more pressing or more controversial aspects of her work, Arendt nonetheless had interesting insights into Greek and Roman concepts of law, human rights, constitutional design, legislation, sovereignty, international tribunals, judicial review and much more. This book retrieves these aspects of her (...) legal philosophy for the attention of both Arendt scholars and lawyers alike. The book brings together lawyers as well as Arendt scholars drawn from a range of disciplines (philosophy, political science, international relations), who have engaged in an internal debate the dynamism of which is captured in print. Following the editors' introduction, the book is split into four Parts: Part I explores the concept of law in Arendt's thought; Part II explores legal aspects of Arendt's constitutional thought: first locating Arendt in the wider tradition of republican constitutionalism, before turning attention to the role of courts and the role of parliament in her constitutional design. In Part III Arendt's thought on international law is explored from a variety of perspectives, covering international institutions and international criminal law, as well as the theoretical foundations of international law. Part IV debates the foundations, content and meaning of Arendt's famous and influential claim that the 'right to have rights' is the one true human right. (shrink)

Constitutional scholarship has put much emphasis on Montesquieu's principle of separation of powers as developed in the chapter of 'The Spirit of the Laws' devoted to the English constitution (XI, 6). It has also been quite common to mix up this model of separation of powers with elements taken from other sections of Montesquieu's masterpiece. The starting point of this paper is that there is an alternative, second model of separation powers based on the French monarchy of intermediate powers, which (...) is also an instantiation of limited government. From this premise, the paper's aim is to carve out a second version of the principle of separation of powers by focusing on the different role and nature of judicial power in the English and French models. It turns out that the French version of the separation of powers is not based on a strict separation, since it bestows on the higher judicial intermediate bodies both judicial and legislative functions. This also leads to a kind of constitutionalism that is 'in between' ancient and modern, as it is exemplified by Montesquieu's take on the functioning of parliaments. As is typical of his political thought, he sees this intermediate power as representative of traditional and conservative social forces but, at the same time, in virtue of its social status, as an institution which strengthens, by opposing it, the monarch's legislative rationality, and legally contains political action. (shrink)

This paper provides an annotated list of printed editions of Aristotle’s Metaphysica Nova, i.e. of the Arabic-Latin 13th-century version of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which circulated within the Latin translation of Averroes’ Commentarium Magnum (Tafsīr mā baʿd al-ṭabīʿat). It is shown that this version – the impact of which was second to none –was never printed without at least one Greek-into-Latin version. From the 1473 editio princeps to the 1562 Iunctasedition, complementary material from the Greek into Latin and from the Arabic into (...) Latin Aristotelian traditions was increasingly added. Links to relevant digital reproductions are also provided. (shrink)